Western Promises
Sustainability and Consequence for Baltic Security
Out of the new geopolitical landscape that emerged
from the fall of the Soviet Union, the emergence of three
small nations on the western coast of the Baltic beacme
important. These states raced to ensure their independence by assimilating into the Western European family
of nations as rapidly as possible. Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia have drawn on their prior experience of independence during the interwar period of 1918-1940 to
create national strategies with the aim of protecting their
post-Soviet autonomy. The Baltic nations continued integration with western economic, political, and military
institutions is sustainable, and will be pursued into the
foreseeable future.

Baltic nations fell into Nazi hands. The Germans were
viewed as liberators to many inhabitants of the region;
however this was not consistent across all three nations.
The Soviet counter-offensive in 1944 led to the final occupation of the Baltic nations, which would last until the
fall of the Warsaw Pact.

It is difficult to understate the impact that this succession
of repeated occupations had on the Baltic States’ views
of state security. The Soviet deportations of hundreds of
thousands of political prisoners, resistance fighters, and
their families left a very real impression on what independence and self-determination means to the people of
the Baltic lands. Thus, the issue of state integrity and
The past two hundred years of history of the Baltic na- independence is viewed as a serious privilege, one where
tions is important, as it greatly influenced the nations’ the consequences of failure are still fresh in national
security strategies through th 21st century. Despite being memory.
a part of the Russian Empire in the 19th century, all three
Baltic nations strived to retain their cultural, linguistic, Geographic and Ethnic Challenges for Baltic Security
and religious independence from increasing efforts to The simple factor of geography presents a challenge to
“Russify” the region. Estonia and Latvia were majority Baltic security, as all three Baltic Nations are fairly close
Lutheran and Lithuania was largely Catholic, helping to to major population centers of Russia. Estonia is the
combat the spread of the Eastern Orthodoxy variant of most egregiously close, as her capital, Tallinn, is less than
Christianity into the region. Also, the Estonian, Latvian, 250 miles away from St. Petersburg. Another liability is
and Lithuanian languages all use romantic characters in the Polish-Lithuanian border, which runs between Katheir written forms as opposed to Cyrillic. Along with liningrad and Belarus with a width of only 40 miles. In
trade ties to Western Europe, these key cultural factors a military conflict, this corridor could very easily be cut
helped to ensure societal integrity and contributed to an off, isolating all three Baltic Nations from their NATO
allies via land. The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad boasts
affinity towards the West rather than the East.
over 1 million inhabitants, is home to Russia’s Baltic Sea
The twenty-year period of independence following the fleet, and reportedly Iskander tactical ballistic missiles.
Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918 allowed all three nations Undoubtedly, Kaliningrad’s location, and active military
to pursue a developmental strategy in line with Western forces, the proximity to Russian soil, and past attempts
European values. However, this process was cut short at Russification of the region constitute a considerable
in 1940, when a Soviet invasion led to the first occupa- threat to Baltic national security.
tion. The new puppet governments set up by the invaders largely surrendered Baltic independence by becom- The presence of substantial ethnic Russian minorities in
ing member states of the Soviet Union. Dissenters were the Baltic Nations presents an opportunity for Kremsent to the gulags in Siberia or simply executed. The next lin-initiated agitation, although this threat is more proyear, with the German invasion of The Soviet Union, the nounced in Latvia and Estonia than Lithuania. 31.3% of
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Latvia’s population and 27.9% of Estonia’s population is ethnic Russian, Belarusian, or Ukrainian while Lithuania has
roughly 7%.
Latvia and Estonia have taken tough
stances against Russian minorities. Following the end of the Soviet Union, both
nations required language tests in their
respective native tongues in order to
qualify for national citizenship. Many
ethnic Russians were left disillusioned,
as both Latvian and Estonian are fairly
difficult languages to learn, and those
of the older generation often had little
desire to adopt another language at all.
Some did not accept the Russian Federation’s offer of citizenship for all former
citizens of the Soviet Union due to the
higher standard of living and increased
opportunities in Latvia and Estonia. A large portion of
these individuals received grey passports, which, after 2007, allowed for unrestricted travel throughout
the Schengen Zone, in addition to relatively easy travel
throughout Russia and members of the Commonwealth
of Independent States. However, grey-passport holders
are unable to vote in national elections in Latvia and Estonia, making true democratic representation difficult to
achieve.
In addition to the aforementioned freedom of movement a “stateless” grey-passport holder enjoys, most ethnic Russians are fairly content living in the Baltic Nations. Lt. Col James Corum, Dean of the Baltic Defense
College in Tartu, Estonia, expressed that during his time
teaching at Tartu University, many of his ethnic Russian
students have thrived in the Estonian educational system and were eventually employed by Estonian firms.
Corum also claimed that they do not have much interest
or attachment to the Russian state. This speaks to the
long-term trend of assimilation, even with the starkest
example of ethnic tension in Estonia. Lithuania, which
features a smaller proportion of ethnic Russians, has
largely integrated them into their society. This is partly due to less political representation of the smaller ethnic population, forcing collaboration between marginal

Russian interest groups, such as ethnic Poles.
Additionally, Russian-orientated media outlets are of
great concern to Baltic policymakers and elites. Media
can influence certain worldviews or beliefs, particularly
when targeted at ethnic, cultural, or linguistic groups.
Television stations such as First Baltic, RTR, Planeta and
NTV Mir have been known to present information with a
decidedly Kremlin bias. Russian civil society groups and
media entities have consistently operated with the intent
of undermining Baltic independence. Baltic governments
aren’t ignoring these perceived efforts to influence domestic Russian-speaking populations. Early this year, a Lithuanian media watchdog agency banned Russian television
channel NTV Mir from operating for three months due to
a provocative movie, which expressed an alternate view of
the 1991 Soviet massacre of 13 Lithuanian civilians 1991
in an attempt to take control of the Vilnius television tower.
It is not unreasonable to predict a scenario where Russian
agents enter a heavily Russian region in Latvia or Estonia and attempt to agitate armed resistance against the
Baltic authorities. The September 2014 scandal regarding
the kidnapped Estonian intelligence agent on Estonian
soil has shown Russian authorities’ disregard for national boundaries. The most obvious target of such agitation

Fall 2015 | 18

would be Narva, a small city of 60,000 in Northeastern
Estonia inhabited by 90% ethnic Russians. How successful any agitation would be is questionable, considering the
higher standard of living and superior economic opportunities in Estonia verses Russia proper.
The Risk of Dependency on Russian Energy
The question of energy security in the Baltic Nations has
been arguably the most pressing issue following their independence. Lithuania and Latvia are, in one way or another, completely dependent on Russian oil and gas for
their energy needs. Corum claimed that, “energy supply
is a key issue that is mentioned by almost all the Baltic
leaders and academics as a major national security concern.” Domestic sources of energy have been stymied by
lack of diversification and increasing European Union
regulations.
Lithuania
once relied on the Ignalina
nuclear reactor, however
European Union concerns
with the safety of nuclear
energy and the age of the
plant led to its decommissioning. Shale gas exploitation has also been delayed
due to EU environmental
concerns.
The exception is Estonia,
which harvests a portion
of its energy supply from
shale oil and is a net exporter of energy. How long this
will remain is questionable,
with the dirty nature of this
extraction and growing
anti-shale oil sentiments
in the European Union at
large. However, all natural
gas imports to Estonia are
provided from Russia. As
the Baltic Nations accepted
European Union economic
integration and regulatory compliance, the further
dependent they became
on their Eastern neighbor,
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and the more leverage that was awarded to Russia. It is
noteworthy to mention that this is not only a problem
with the Baltic Nations, but many members of Eastern
Europe as well.
With recent events in Ukraine showcasing a resurgent
Russia, Lithuania and Latvia are making plans to increase
their energy independence. In Spring 2015 the Lithuanian government ordered a floating liquefied natural
gas terminal dubbed “Independence.” It arrived in the
port city of Klaipeda to accept natural gas exports from
the United States and diversify Lithuania’s energy source
portfolio, as well as make a political statement. Latvia is
continuing to diversify its energy mix by bringing in additional renewable sources such as hydroelectric power.
In addition to attempts to align
the Baltic energy sector with Europe, currency and finance have
also been pathways towards the
West. The arrival of the euro as
a replacement of the lita in Lithuania this past January marked
the moment all three Baltic Nations became fully integrated
into the Euro-Zone. With Latvia and Estonia joining in 2014
and 2011 respectively, the Euro
was the natural progression in
the Baltic Nations’ quest for
Western European integration.
All three nations have fairly
strong growth rates, even despite the situation in Ukraine
and perceived vulnerability to
potential Russian military aggression or economic sanctions.
While the introduction of the
euro brings eases trade with
Western European nations, its
presence also acts as a component in national security. Any
potential invasion of a member
of the Eurozone adds another
dimension to the scenario, and
increased repercussions for the
invader.
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Baltic Involvement in NATO
All three Baltic Nations have been active participants in NATO since their
admission in 2004. In addition, they
have all been consistent partners in
the NATO-led missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, actively pledging troops
whenever possible. While Latvia and
Lithuania have struggled to meet the 2%
defense spending baseline requested by
NATO, Estonia is currently meeting the
minimum requirement. Recent rhetoric out of Moscow, the crisis in Eastern
Ukraine, and the invasion of Crimea
seem to be having a persuasive effect
on both Lithuania and Latvia in regards
to increasing their defense expenditure
as they seek to solidify their position as
NATO allies. Lithuania even reinstated
conscription for a five-year term in order to bolster army manpower by 3,000
to 3,500 soldiers per annum.
As NATO members, the Baltic Nations are entitled to the Article 5 notion
of collective defense. This is the most important aspect
of the Baltic nations’ national security strategies. Relying on allies is not only the most logical decision for the
nations, but, practically speaking, it is their only option
when facing a populous and militarily-powerful country such as Russia. In fact, Lithuanian military doctrine
purports that, in case of invasion, small squads of soldiers will conduct guerilla activities aimed at harassing
the invading force long enough for conventional NATO
reinforcements to arrive. This reflects Lithuanian experiences following the second Soviet occupation, where the
“forest brothers” waged unconventional warfare for several years, expecting an American and Western European
liberation that never materialized.

No military operations were
conducted by NATO during
the Cold War. Since 1990 it has
engaged in multiple peacekeeping
operations and military interventions

NATO country, to a multinational force of twelve aircraft.
In fall 2014, the United States deployed armored assets to
all three Baltic countries, totaling twenty tanks along with
infantry support. Despite the perceived escalation of military forces in the Baltics, the likelihood of an engagement
with Russian forces remains slim. The main goal of these
actions is to send a message that NATO takes its Article
5 obligations seriously and is willing to deploy forces as
deterrence.

Nearly twenty-five years of independence have given the
Baltic nations the opportunity to align with western institutions in a bid for security from their eastern neighbor.
This strategy has been economically and politically successful so far, and appears to be sustainable, assuming both
The emergence of an unpredictable and militant Russian Western societal stability and a continuing international
foreign policy has without question affected the strategic will to protect the Baltic States from eastern aggression.
balance in the Baltic States. Russian aircraft have been
increasingly willing to violate Estonian airspace, with
Clay Moore
over five incursions in 2014 alone. These violations have
M.A. Candiate
led to the Baltic Air Policing mission being bolstered
International Security
from a rotating contingent of four aircraft from a single
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